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INTRODUCTION 
Too many people in the United States are overwhelmed by debt.  While 
we were once a country of thrift, consumer indebtedness has become a 
ubiquitous phenomenon that affects people in both urban and rural areas 
and from all socio-economic groups.  Because so many people are over-
indebted,1 the United States is in the midst of a severe economic meltdown 
and the magnitude of the federal government’s intervention in the financial 
markets is surpassed only by the bailout efforts to end the Great Depres-
sion.2 
The economic crisis was caused by the record number of defaults on 
subprime mortgage loans and the foreclosures that followed those defaults.  
For the last two years, U.S. homeowners—like consumers in the rest of the 
world—have felt the financial pain associated with rising fuel and food 
prices.  The increase in the prices of those commodities, however, was not 
the reason homeowners started defaulting on their subprime mortgages.  
Instead, the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis was triggered by (and then 
morphed into a global financial crisis) the over-consumption of consumer 
credit generally and our gluttonous consumption of mortgage debt. 
This Article discusses the rise in consumer debt generally, the harm that 
the current credit crisis has caused to the U.S. economy and global capital 
markets, and the specific threats that the current financial crisis pose to 
U.S. cities.  Part I discusses the increased availability of consumer debt and 
how deregulated consumer credit markets, along with technological, demo-
graphic, and labor market changes, caused lending standards to become so 
relaxed that people were able to buy homes they clearly could not afford.  
Part I also notes how shifts in societal views toward thrift and borrowing 
have caused too many people to borrow too much in a desperate attempt to 
participate in the “American Dream” of homeownership. 
Part II focuses on the current financial crisis.  This Part presents current 
overall consumer debt levels and then discusses the harmful effects of the 
financial crisis on homeowners, the financial sector, and even groups that 
are unrelated to the housing industry (such as college students).  Part II 
then briefly describes the initial responses to the financial crisis and the 
various, but ultimately failed, attempts to prevent the subprime credit crisis 
from spreading. 
Part III suggests that, rather than wait for federal bailouts, localities take 
proactive steps (including purchasing foreclosed homes) to prevent this fi-
 
 1. For the purposes of this Article, I define “over-indebtedness” as a consumer’s inabil-
ity to repay all debts in full in the near future. 
 2. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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nancial crisis from decimating their cities.  The Article ends by stressing 
that the metastasizing mortgage crisis threatens to leave urban areas with a 
glut of abandoned homes and that an increase in distressed neighborhoods 
may reverse years of urban renewal projects. 
I.  THE INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF CONSUMER DEBT 
In the 1960s, it was not easy to obtain low-cost credit.  At that time, low-
cost credit principally existed in only two forms and was given only to con-
sumers who had stable income and who could document assets that could 
be pledged as collateral.3  The first type of low-cost credit consisted of 
long-term, conventional mortgages issued either by commercial banks or 
the U.S. government.4  The second type consisted of installment loans from 
local commercial institutions or credit unions that were issued only after an 
official of the lending institution examined the borrower’s income and as-
sets in detail and concluded that the borrower was creditworthy.5 
Until the late 1970s, a borrower who wanted to obtain credit to purchase 
an item almost always would be forced to have a face-to-face meeting with 
the lender and, except for the wealthy, would be required to document their 
income and assets.6  Borrowers who did not have assets they could pledge 
as collateral and people who could not (or would not) document that they 
had stable income would almost always be denied credit.  The only type of 
credit that might have been available for them would be offered by local 
department stores or automobile dealers in the form of installment loans 
that would allow them to purchase items only from the lender that issued 
the credit.7 
That has all changed.  Since the late 1970s, consumer credit has risen at 
astronomical rates in this country.8  It is impossible to understand the cur-
 
 3. HOWARD D. CROSSE & GEORGE H. HEMPEL, MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR COMMER-
CIAL BANKS 175, 181 (2d ed. 1973). 
 4. See Adam Gordon, Note, The Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal Changes 
in Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to Whites and Out 
of Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE L.J. 186, 194 (2005) (describing the evolution of low-cost, 
long-term credit in the home mortgage market). 
 5. Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Reform and Credit Cards, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 175, 
180 (2007). 
 6. CROSSE & HEMPEL, supra note 3, at 181.  Lenders also waive this requirement for 
high-income workers, who might prefer not to disclose their income, but can afford the 
monthly payments, and also for self-employed or seasonal workers, who might have high 
income, but are unable to verify that income. 
 7. DAVID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE:  A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 37 
(1974). 
 8. In August of 1976, the consumer debt outstanding was just over $216 billion.  That 
number has grown to over $2.5 trillion in 2008.  Federal Reserve, Consumer Credit Out-
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rent credit crisis without understanding why so many consumers started 
amassing so much debt.  To understand that, one must ask why it has be-
come so easy for so many borrowers to get so much credit.  For the most 
part, the over-consumption of credit can be traced to the deregulation of the 
consumer credit market and to the resulting “democratization” of credit.9 
A. Deregulation 
Starting in the mid-1970s, the U.S. government deregulated the con-
sumer credit market and made it easier and more profitable to extend credit 
to consumers.10  With fewer regulatory controls and especially with relaxed 
usury laws, creditors were willing to increase the amount of credit they 
would extend to a group of consumers who had until then been deemed 
unworthy of credit.11  Indeed, until the mortgage meltdown seized the 
credit markets, anyone (regardless of his credit risk) and anything (whether 
human or not) could reasonably expect to receive a credit card offer.12 
With interest rate ceilings largely lifted, extending credit to even high-
risk borrowers became quite profitable.  Lenders were willing to give credit 
even to borrowers with bad credit (in other words, subprime borrowers)13 
because they could charge significantly higher rates to compensate for any 
increased risk of default when lending to riskier borrowers.14  The effect 
that a deregulated market had on consumer credit transactions can perhaps 
 
standing, http://federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/hist/cc_hist_sa.txt (last visited Mar. 19, 
2009). 
 9. SUSAN JENSEN-CONKLIN, AM. BANKR. INST., MINUTES OF MEETING HELD, PLENARY 
SESSION:  CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY (1996); Diane Ellis, The Effect of Consumer Interest 
Rate Deregulation on Credit Card Volumes, Charge-Offs, and the Personal Bankruptcy 
Rate, in DIV. OF INS., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., BANK TRENDS:  ANALYSIS OF EMERGING 
RISKS IN BANKING 9 (FDIC Div. of Ins., Pub. No. 98-05, 1998), available at http://www. 
fdic.gov/bank/analytical /bank/bt_9805.pdf; Jean Braucher, Chapters, Changes, and Chal-
lenges:  A Fresh Start for Personal Bankruptcy Reform:  The Need for Simplification and a 
Single Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1302 (2006). 
 10. Ellis, supra note 9, at 5-6. 
 11. Emilio Fernandez-Corugedo & John Muellbauer, Consumer Credit Conditions in the 
United Kingdom 5, 8 (Bank of Eng., Working Paper No. 314, 2006). 
 12. See Credit Cards at 50:  The Problems of Ubiquity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2000, at 
C11 (noting that former Chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan once commented 
that “[c]hildren, dogs, cats and moose are getting credit cards”). 
 13. In general, prime loans are offered to borrowers who have strong credit histories.  
Borrowers with weak or limited credit histories or who have high debt ratios generally are 
forced into the higher-cost subprime market because they are viewed as posing a higher risk 
of default.  Robert B. Avery et al., Higher-Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data, 
92 FED. RES. BULL. A123, A125 (2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ 
bulletin/2006/hmda/bull06hmda.pdf. 
 14. Ellis, supra note 9, at 7. 
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best be illustrated by the differences entailed in buying a home pre- and 
post-deregulation. 
1. Housing Purchases:  Then 
People who wanted to borrow money to purchase a home in the United 
States up until the 1970s were required to make a significant down pay-
ment, then agree to make consistent monthly loan payments for an ex-
tended period of time, typically fifteen or thirty years.15  That is, before de-
regulation, potential homeowners either had to make a down payment of at 
least 20% or had to purchase private mortgage insurance (“PMI”) if they 
failed to pay 20% down.16  Forcing borrowers to make down payments pro-
tected the lender by lowering the total mortgage debt (and, thus, the 
lender’s total risk of loss) and also forced the borrowers to make up-front 
financial investments in their housing purchases.  The down payment re-
quirement ordinarily would be waived only for wealthy borrowers who ac-
tually had the funds to make the down payment but wanted to use their 
cash to make other investments.17 
2. Housing Purchases:  Now 
Starting in the early part of this decade, interest rates started to fall and 
the United States experienced unprecedented home price appreciation.  The 
rate of appreciation in some markets was astronomical.18  Housing prices in 
the aggregate increased by more than 50% over the last decade and, in 
some regions, had annual increases of over 10%.19  These skyrocketing 
housing prices benefited some homeowners and created vast sums of 
 
 15. See FED. HOUS. AUTH., 28TH ANNUAL REPORT 93-94 (1961) (noting that current in-
vestments—down payment plus closing costs—averaged about 16% of income for new-
home purchasers).  In 1971, 99.9% of all mortgages were for a term of twenty years or 
more.  STATISTICAL ANALYSIS & RESEARCH BRANCH, FED. HOUS. AUTH., FHA TRENDS OF 
HOME MORTGAGE CHARACTERISTICS:  3D QTR. 1972, at 6 (1973). 
 16. ALLEN J. FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., EXOTIC OR 
TOXIC? AN EXAMINATION OF THE NON-TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE MARKET FOR CONSUMERS 
AND LENDERS 12 (2006), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/exotic_toxic 
_mortgage_report0506.pdf. 
 17. Id.; Pamela Gaynor, Homeowners May Be Mortgaging Their Future with New Loan 
Products, PITTS. POST-GAZETTE, July 31, 2005, at A1. 
 18. Frederic S. Mishkin, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech 
Before the Forecaster’s Club of New York: Enterprise Risk Management and Mortgage 
Lending (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/ 
Mishkin20070117a.htm. 
 19. FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 16, at 28. 
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wealth for them.20  These gains were not, however, evenly distributed and 
housing price appreciation ultimately created a significant unaffordability 
problem for renters who wanted to purchase homes—especially homes in 
some east and west coast markets.21 
The extended boom in house price appreciation actually fueled the con-
sumption of housing (and of the mortgages associated with those houses) 
that otherwise would not have been possible.  That is, while non-traditional 
loan products were offered ostensibly to make housing more affordable, 
these loan products actually aggravated the meteoric house price apprecia-
tion.  By allowing cash-strapped borrowers with bad credit to buy a home 
with no money down, and by letting these borrowers make artificially low 
monthly payments, consumers who could not afford to buy these homes 
suddenly could afford to become a homeowner even though the loan prod-
ucts placed the borrowers at great financial risk. 
Of course, some borrowers may have been greedy by attempting to pur-
chase a house they simply could not afford, and others may have engaged 
in outright fraud.  For example, recent reports suggest that some borrowers 
intentionally inflated their incomes on liar loans,22 rented or borrowed the 
credit scores of more creditworthy borrowers, paid to be added to the credit 
cards of people with good credit histories, or bought fake payroll stubs.23  
 
 20. See Hang Nguyen, Will Their Kids Ever Be Able to Buy a House?, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 
2005, at 12 (describing how homeowners in Orange County, California, benefit from the 
rise in home prices, but are concerned because their children cannot afford homes in the 
same area); see also Jon Birger, Should You Cash out While You Can?, MONEY, Aug. 1, 
2005, at 51. 
 21. See, e.g., Karl E. Case & Robert J. Shiller, The Behavior of Home Buyers in Boom 
and Post-Boom Markets 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2748, 
1988) (discussing capriciousness of housing price appreciation wealth distribution); see also 
Affordable Housing Needs in the City of Houston:  Unique Challenges and Opportunities:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Economic Opportunity of the H. Comm. on 
Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 8 (2007) (testimony of Daniel Bustamante, Executive Direc-
tor, Greater Houston Fair Housing Center), available at http://financialservices 
.house.gov/hearing110/htbustamante102907.pdf (stating that the “dream of home ownership 
continues to be just a dream for most working people” in Houston). 
 22. Gretchen Morgenson, Crisis Looms in Market for Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 
2007, at A1 (reporting that liar loans were 40% of the subprime mortgage issuance in 2006).  
Members of the mortgage industry suggest that some borrowers took out a mortgage to buy 
a home with the intent only of living in the home rent-free until they were evicted.  See 
Justin Lahart, After Subprime:  Lax Lending Lurks Elsewhere, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2007, at 
C1.  Of course, the increased practice of approving low documentation subprime loans in-
creases the likelihood of buyer misrepresentation. 
 23. Julie Creswell, Fake Pay Stubs Online, and Other Mortgage Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 16, 2007, at A1; see The Role of the Secondary Market in Subprime Mortgage Lend-
ing:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. 
Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 131 (2007) [hereinafter The Role of the Secondary 
Market] (statement of Larry B. Litton, Jr., President, CEO, Litton Loan Servicing LP) (stat-
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Other homeowners, however, especially first-time homeowners, appear to 
have been naïve, unsophisticated, and genuinely seemed shocked to learn 
that it would be difficult to sell their homes once the housing market 
stalled.  Likewise some seemed surprised to discover that, even though they 
had no equity in their homes, refinancing their high-cost loans was not an 
option.24  Finally, information asymmetry appears to have caused some of 
these borrowers to accept expensive, non-traditional, mortgage products 
even though they did not understand the loan features25 and even though 
they may have qualified for a lower-cost loan product.26 
 
ing that defaults were “the result of lax underwriting standards, improper documentation, or 
borrower fraud”); see also MERLE SHARICK ET AL., MORTGAGE ASSET RESEARCH INST., LLC, 
NINTH PERIODIC MORTGAGE FRAUD CASE REPORT TO MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION 11 
(2007). 
 24. Subprime and Predatory Mortgage Lending:  New Regulatory Guidance, Current 
Market Conditions, and Effects on Regulated Financial Institutions:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial 
Servs., 110th Cong. 396-97 (2007) [hereinafter Subprime and Predatory Lending] (state-
ment of Harry H. Dinham, President, National Association of Mortgage Brokers) (speculat-
ing on the cause of the increase); FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 16, at 2, 6, 11; Vikas 
Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Home Lenders Hit by Higher Default Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 
2007, at C1.  Consumers, in general, suffer from an overconfidence bias that leads them to 
believe that they will not overuse credit and that, if they do, they will somehow find money 
to repay their debts. Oren Bar-Gill, Homo Economicus, Homo Myopicus, and the Law and 
Economics of Consumer Choice:  Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 33, 45 (2006); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1395–
1401 (2004). 
 25. See Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 24, at 72-73 (statement of Sheila 
C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); id. at 351 (statement of Allen 
Fishbein, Director of Housing and Credit Policy, Consumer Federation of America); BRIAN 
BUCKS & KAREN PENCE, FED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS, DO HOMEOWNERS KNOW THEIR 
HOUSE VALUES AND MORTGAGE TERMS? 26 (2006), available at http://www.federalreserve 
.gov/Pubs/feds/2006/200603/200603pap.pdf; MARK WIRANOWSKI, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. 
STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., SUSTAINING HOME OWNERSHIP THROUGH EDUCATION AND 
COUNSELING 6 (2003) (discussing informational rents extracted from naïve homeowners 
when lenders offer complex products that are not conducive to consumer comprehension), 
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/homeownership/w03-7_wiranowski. 
pdf. 
 26. See Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 24, at 76 (statement of Sheila C. 
Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); id. at 351 (statement of Allen 
Fishbein, Director of Housing and Credit Policy, Consumer Federation of America); BUCKS 
& PENCE, supra note 25, at 26; FANNIE MAE, THE GROWING DEMAND FOR HOUSING:  2002 
FANNIE MAE NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY (2002), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/ 
global/pdf/media/survey/survey2002.pdf. 
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B. Responses to the Unaffordability Problem 
Because of the low (and, in many years, negative) U.S. savings rate,27 
the down payment requirement often prevented renters in low-income and 
urban areas from becoming homeowners.28  Likewise, because potential 
homeowners lacked the capital to reduce the principal amount of the mort-
gage debt by making a sizeable down payment, many found that they could 
not afford the monthly payments for traditional thirty-year fixed interest 
rate mortgages.  The U.S. government encouraged mortgage originators to 
help rectify this affordability problem by diversifying their loan products.  
The lending industry eagerly complied with this request by radically alter-
ing the criteria they applied when approving mortgage loans and by creat-
ing and extensively marketing a wide array of non-traditional (also called 
“exotic” or “alternative”) products.29  These exotic loans had several com-
mon features. 
While conventional mortgage products pre-deregulation typically were 
for fifteen- or thirty-year periods, to make monthly loan payments more af-
fordable, some of the new mortgage products offered extended maturity 
mortgage loans for terms up to forty or fifty years.30  In addition, while 
lenders historically had required all borrowers (except perhaps very rich 
ones) to document their income and assets, lenders not only began to gen-
 
 27. Until the recent financial meltdown, for the last several years the United States has 
had a negative savings rate:  Americans saved less than they spent on goods or services. 
News Release, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Personal Income and Outlays (Sept. 2007), 
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/pi/2007/pi0907.htm.  Ironically, the current eco-
nomic downturn has now caused U.S. consumers to save more.  News Release, Bureau of 
Econ. Analysis, Personal Income and Outlays (Nov. 2006), http://www.bea.gov/news 
releases/national/pi/2006/pi1106.htm; see also Kelly Evans, Hard-Hit Families Finally Start 
Saving, Aggravating Nation’s Economic Woes, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 6, 2009, at A1. 
 28. See Julie Kosterlitz, Home Sweet Home?, NAT’L J., Mar. 6, 2004. 
 29. The Mortgage Bankers Association defines “nontraditional mortgage products” as 
“financing options which have been developed to increase flexibility and affordability and 
otherwise meet the needs of homebuyers who have been purchasing homes in an environ-
ment where real estate prices have increased faster than borrowers’ incomes.” Preserving 
the American Dream:  Predatory Lending Practices and Home Foreclosures:  Hearing Be-
fore the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 7 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter Preserving the American Dream] (statement of Douglas G. Duncan, Senior Vice Presi-
dent of Research and Business Development, and Chief Economist, Mortgage Bankers 
Association), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/duncan.pdf. 
 30. FITCH RATINGS, 2006 GLOBAL STRUCTURED FINANCE OUTLOOK:  ECONOMIC AND 
SECTOR-BY-SECTOR ANALYSIS (2006); Gretchen Morgenson, Home Loans:  A Nightmare 
Grows Darker, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at C1; Holden Lewis, 50-Year Mortgage Debuts 
in California, BANKRATE.COM, Apr. 27, 2006, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/ 
mortgages/20060427a2.asp.  Extended maturity mortgage loans have terms for longer than 
thirty years and produce a product that looks substantially similar to a monthly rental pay-
ment.  See id. (describing the forty-year loan, which results in lower monthly payments). 
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erally approve loans for borrowers who did not document their income and 
assets but often would not even ask borrowers to do so.  To make it easier 
to approve loans (and perhaps to make it less likely that either the loan of-
ficer or borrower would be forced to falsify documents), lenders approved 
no documentation or low documentation (commonly referred to as “no 
doc,” “low doc,”“ or “liar”) loans.31  In approving these loans, lenders used 
fairly minimal standards to verify the borrower’s income and assets and 
typically relied on the credit scoring devices that credit card companies 
used when deciding whether to give a consumer a credit card.32 
The unaffordability problem that housing price appreciation created, 
coupled with a negative savings rate, made it difficult for renters in most 
income groups to amass the funds needed to make a down payment.  To al-
leviate this problem, lenders relaxed (and at times altogether abandoned) 
the down payment requirement.33  Moreover, to make it easier for renters 
without savings to buy homes, lenders offered mortgages with high loan-to-
value (“LTV”) ratios that would permit borrowers to take out a loan (or 
loans) equal to the sales price of their home.34  For example, rather than re-
 
 31. Peter Henderson et al., Frenzy of Risky Mortgages Leaves Path of Destruction, 
REUTERS, May 8, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSN03298922200705 
08; see also Preserving the American Dream, supra note 29, at 4-6 (statement of Jean Con-
stantine-Davis, Senior Attorney, AARP Foundation), available at http://banking.senate.gov/ 
public/_files/davis.pdf (describing perils to consumer of “stated income” loans).  A different 
variation of stated income loans are no income, no asset (“NINA”) loans.  With these loans, 
the borrower is not required to disclose income or assets.  See, e.g., No Income Documenta-
tion Home Loans, http://www.bestnodocloans.com/content/nina_loan.htm (last visited Mar. 
2, 2009).  These loans are approved based on the borrower’s employment, credit history, the 
property value, and the down payment (if any).  Another variation, a no income no asset, no 
employment (“NINANE”) loan, does not require the borrower to disclose income, assets, or 
employment.  See id. 
 32. Because those scoring devices have never been used to verify income (and, indeed, 
do not consider income at all), lenders protected themselves from the increased risk of de-
fault by charging borrowers higher interest rates for these loans.  See Kenneth R. Harney, 
The Lowdown on Low-Doc Loans, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2006, at F1 (describing how low-
doc and no-doc loans work).  Credit scores are neither designed to predict whether a bor-
rower will face a payment shock and be unable to make payments on an ARM mortgage 
loan after the interest rate resets, nor are they designed to anticipate whether economic con-
ditions will permit the borrower to refinance the ARM loan to a more affordable product.  
Therefore, using credit scores to approve liar loans increases the risk that borrowers cannot 
afford to repay the loans and likely will default. 
 33. William E. Nelson & Norman R. Williams, Suburbanization and Market Failure:  
An Analysis of Government Policies Promoting Suburban Growth and Ethnic Assimilation, 
27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 197, 226−33 (1999) (tracing the history of government intervention 
in the housing markets to expand home ownership by loosening financial requirements). 
 34. Calculated Risk:  Assessing Non-Traditional Mortgage Products, Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Housing and Transportation and the Subcomm. on Economic Policy of the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 4, 6 (2006) [hereinafter 
Calculated Risk] (statement of William A. Simpson, Vice President, Mortgage Insurance 
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quiring borrowers to make a $20,000 down payment when purchasing a 
$100,000 home, lenders would let borrowers purchase a home with no 
money down by taking out a first mortgage (typically for 80% of the value 
of the home) and then a simultaneous second mortgage (or line of credit) 
for the balance of the sales price, a loan system commonly referred to as a 
“piggyback” loan.35 
Perhaps the most significant differences between pre- and post-
deregulation mortgages, however, were the prevalence of the flexible inter-
est rates that the new products offered and the loan features that made it 
possible for borrowers (including those with poor credit) to have low initial 
monthly loan payments.  Traditional, pre-deregulation, mortgages almost 
always calculated the borrower’s monthly payment based on principal and 
a fixed rate of interest.36  In contrast, most of the new non-traditional inno-
vated mortgages typically had adjustable interest rates (known as adjustable 
rate mortgages, or “ARMs”) that started low then adjusted on specific fu-
ture dates.37  Once the rate “reset,” the low initial monthly payments would 
increase based on the new, higher “fully-indexed” rate.38  Because monthly 
payments could increase dramatically at the reset, there could be catastro-
 
Companies of America), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/ACF84D5.pdf; 
FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 16, at 12. 
 35. Piggyback lending arrangements let borrowers avoid purchasing PMI.  Borrowers 
sometimes put no money down, though many borrowed 80% with a traditional mortgage, 
10% as a second loan, and put 10% down. FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 16, at 3; 
Robert B. Avery et al., Higher-Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data, 92 FED. 
RES. BULL. A123, A135, A137-38 (2006). 
 36. See Fed. Hous. Admin., Common Questions About an FHA-Insured Loan, 
http://portal.hud.gov (follow “Consumers” hyperlink; then follow “FHA Consumer Market-
place” hyperlink; then follow “FHA Insured Loans Q&A” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 10, 
2009) (comparing FHA and conventional loans). 
 37. After the initial period, monthly payments “reset” and borrowers are required to pay 
down (amortize) the mortgage at a faster rate.  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE 
SYS., INTEREST-ONLY MORTGAGE PAYMENTS AND PAYMENT-OPTION ARMS—ARE THEY 
FOR YOU? 3-4 (2006) [hereinafter INTEREST-ONLY MORTGAGE].  Some products, like de-
ferred interest ARMs, included annual caps that let borrowers remain in their homes not-
withstanding any temporary payment shock caused when the interest rates reset.  If the reset 
interest rate caused the monthly payments to exceed this cap, the borrower could defer in-
terest payments and the deferred interest would be added to principal balance.  See Greg 
McBride, Home Loan Elements Can Be Risky:  Adjustable Rates Can Be Unpredictable for 
Borrowers, DETROIT NEWS, Sep. 12, 2004, at 3D. 
 38. Mortgage originators calculate the interest rate for an ARM by referring to a pub-
lished index rate then adding a few percentage points (“the margin”) to that rate. The ad-
justed rate, generally referred to as the “fully-indexed” rate, for an ARM is the margin plus 
index rate.  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON 
ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES 8-9 (2006) [hereinafter CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON ARMS], 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/arms/arms_english.htm. 
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phic consequences if borrowers could not afford the new higher monthly 
payments and often suffered what is referred to as a “payment shock.”39 
One product in particular is widely believed to be the main reason the 
U.S. subprime mortgage market started to collapse.  This product—a “hy-
brid ARM”—started as a thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage with a short-term 
introductory interest rate (a “teaser” rate) then converted to an ARM after 
two to three years.40  The interest rate on these “2/28s” and “3/27s” would 
then periodically reset over the thirty-year term of the loan and the bor-
rower’s monthly payment after the first two or three years would be recal-
culated and would change based on the interest rate in effect when the loan 
rate reset.41 
C. Technology 
In addition to decreased regulation of consumer credit generally (and 
mortgage debt specifically), technological advances also made it easier for 
lenders to dramatically expand the amount of consumer debt (both mort-
gage and credit card) they were willing to give high-risk borrowers.  Mort-
gage and credit card applications are available and can be approved in a 
matter of seconds on the internet.  No longer are bank officers required to 
scrutinize a potential borrower’s financial information.  Instead, when de-
ciding whether to grant a credit application, lenders now rely on credit 
scores and other modeling devices to evaluate the borrower’s credit and de-
termine the probability that a borrower will default.  These scoring devices 
combine individual and statistical risks, and have largely replaced face-to-
face meetings between potential borrowers and lenders in most routine 
consumer credit transactions in the United States and in other nations.42  
 
 39. See FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 16, at 9-12; see also Subprime and Predatory 
Lending, supra note 24, at 6 (statement of Shelia C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation); Les Christie, Subprime Bailouts:  How They Work, CNNMONEY, Apr. 
24, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/04/24/real_estate/bailout_plans_how_they_work/ 
index.htm.  The lending industry also refers to a payment shock as “reset payment sensitiv-
ity.”  See CHRISTOPHER L. CAGAN, FIRST AM. REAL ESTATE SOLUTIONS, MORTGAGE PAY-
MENT RESET:  THE RUMOR AND THE REALITY 19 (2006), available at http://www. 
loanperformance.com/infocenter/whitepaper/FARES_resets_whitepaper_021406.pdf. 
 40. Until recently, hybrid ARMs dominated the ARM market.  FISHBEIN & WOODALL, 
supra note 16, at 10; John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks at the National 
Foundation for Credit Counseling Spring Meeting 2 (Apr. 24, 2007), available at 
http://occ.gov/ftp/release/2007-44a.pdf.  Many large lenders no longer offer these loans. Vi-
kas Bajaj, Top Lender Sees Mortgage Woes for ‘Good’ Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 25, 2007, at 
A1. 
 41. FISHBEIN &  WOODALL, supra note 16, at 10.  While all ARMs adjust upward, not all 
of them adjust downward.  See CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON ARMS, supra note 38, at 6-7. 
 42. See RONALD MANN, CHARGING AHEAD:  THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAY-
MENT CARD MARKETS 113-14 (2006) (noting that credit bureaus allowed lenders to deter-
DICKERSON_CHRISTENSEN 4/21/2009  3:51:06 PM 
406 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
Not surprisingly, because credit can now be quickly and efficiently ap-
proved, creditors have extended considerably more credit than they did 
twenty years ago.43 
The demand for credit, especially credit cards, has also been fueled by 
advances in technology.  Because of the omnipresence of the internet and 
the explosion in online shopping opportunities, most consumers need to 
have a credit card in order to shop on the internet.  Though one can, of 
course, debate whether anyone needs to shop on the internet, once the deci-
sion is made to shop online it is virtually impossible to do so without a 
credit card.44 
D. U.S. Labor Markets 
U.S. consumer debt levels also appear to have increased because of dra-
matic changes in U.S. labor markets over the last two decades.  Permanent 
unemployment rates in the United States have remained at approximately 
5% for the last several years.  While they have started increasing during the 
current credit crisis, rates have not increased significantly over the last two 
decades.45  Even while permanent unemployment rates have remained 
fairly low, however, U.S. workers are at an increased risk of having spells 
of temporary unemployment either because of global outsourcing of jobs 
from the United States, or because corporate restructurings have resulted in 
workers either being terminated or laid off for short periods of time.46  For 
 
mine the potential performance of future borrowers, resulting in this technique being widely 
used along with computer technology advancement in the 1990s). 
 43. Emilio Fernandez-Corugedo & John Muellbauer, Consumer Credit Conditions in the 
United Kingdom 5 (Bank of Eng., Working Paper No. 314, 2006); Oliver J. Haas, Overin-
debtedness in Germany 2 (Int’l Labour Office Geneva, Working Paper No. 44, 2006); see 
also MANN, supra note 42, at 113-14 (noting that increased accuracy of risk assessment al-
lowed lenders to increase amounts lent to consumers, indicating a positive relationship be-
tween credit bureau data and increased consumer lending). 
 44. Some companies like Paypal do let buyers make purchases by deducting the cost of 
the item from their banking accounts.  Paypal, http://www.paypal.com/aboutus.cfm (last vis-
ited Mar. 25, 2009). 
 45. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS 
FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsatabs.htm 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2009) (follow hyperlink to Table A-10:  Employed and Unemployed 
Persons by Occupation, Not Seasonally Adjusted, and calculate data from 1988 to 2008). 
 46. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS 84-85 (2000); Press 
Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Extended Mass Layoffs Associated with Domestic and 
Overseas Relocations, First Quarter 2004 (June 10, 2004), available at http://stats.bls.gov/ 
news.release/pdf/reloc.pdf; N. Gregory Mankiw & Phillip Swagel, The Politics and Eco-
nomics of Offshore Outsourcing 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
12398, 1981), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2006/HIER2120. 
pdf. 
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many workers, a temporary layoff can be just as catastrophic as a job ter-
mination because they have no savings and, thus, no nest-egg to rely on to 
pay their expenses until they get a new job (or get their old job back). 
In addition to the increased risk of temporary unemployment, income 
has not kept pace with inflation, except for those in the highest earning 
brackets.47  When combined with a lack of savings, stagnant wages have 
caused U.S. workers to rely on consumer credit to help them pay their 
monthly expenses.48  With flat earnings and no savings, temporarily unem-
ployed workers came to view consumer credit, and especially credit cards, 
as a substitute for savings.49 
Finally, even fully employed workers in the United States may find it 
hard to pay their expenses if they have catastrophic medical expenses.  That 
is, even if the person works and has health insurance, he will likely be re-
quired to pay a large percentage of his health costs either in the form of co-
payments or because of health insurance lifetime caps.  Thus, the combina-
tion of stagnant and declining real wages in the United States and virtually 
no savings causes many consumers to use credit to pay for medical ex-
penses even if they have health insurance.50 
E. Changed Norms 
1. Thrift 
While there still seems to be a stigma associated with being insolvent,51 
there no longer seems to be any stigma associated with going deeply into 
debt.52  Credit is seductive, and for some consumers it almost seems to be 
addictive.53  Delayed gratification is simply no longer the norm in the 
 
 47. Greg Ip, Not Your Father’s Pay:  Why Wages Today Are Weaker, WALL ST. J., May 
25, 2007, at A2. 
 48. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 46, at 114. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 146; Health Insurance Caps Leave Patients Stranded, MSNBC, Jul. 13, 2009, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25644309/. 
 51. 151 CONG. REC. S2421 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (“Peo-
ple I have known who have gone through bankruptcy are not proudly announcing to their 
friends:  Well, I had a great day in bankruptcy court.  These are people who are a little em-
barrassed, a little ashamed of what they had to go through.”); Rafael Efrat, Bankruptcy 
Stigma:  Plausible Causes for Shifting Norms, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 481, 485-87 & 
nn.21-27 (2006); Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Less Stigma or More Financial Distress, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 213, 218 (2006). 
 52. STUART VYSE, GOING BROKE:  WHY AMERICANS CAN’T HOLD ON TO THEIR MONEY 
61-89 (2008); David Brooks, The Culture of Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 22, 2008, at A19. 
 53. See Jennifer Levitz, Hi, My Name Is Fred, and I’m Addicted to Credit, WALL ST. J., 
June 10, 2008, at 1; Steven Mufson, End of Cheap Credit Hits Homes, Businesses, WASH. 
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United States, and people no longer seem to think there is a moral or ethical 
duty to exercise the restraint to actually wait until one can afford to pay for 
non-essential goods and services with cash before purchasing those items.54  
Consumers today want the immediate gratification associated with having 
goods and services, and with having those things now.55  Indeed, many now 
argue that the United States no longer has a culture of thrift and, instead, 
has a culture of debt fueled in large part by these changed norms.56 
2. The Myth of Homeownership 
Even when it became clear that irresponsible lending practices would 
force the government to intervene in the financial markets, many in the 
lending community and many governmental officials blamed consumers 
for buying homes they could not afford and argued that borrowers should 
not be pitied or rescued because to do so would create a moral hazard prob-
lem.57  When lenders made it easier for potential homebuyers to increase 
their mortgage debt, borrowers (both homeowners and real estate specula-
tors) voraciously consumed mortgage debt to ensure that they could take 
advantage of the supra-normal housing price appreciation.58  Renters were 
desperate to become homeowners principally because they believed in the 
hype associated with the “American Dream of Homeownership.” 
The belief that homeownership is a good thing financially and psycho-
logically caused many renters to do whatever it took to enter into the 
vaulted state of homeownership.  For example, it is undisputed that many 
consumers borrowed recklessly in order to live in a “McMansion.”59  As 
 
POST, Mar. 18, 2008, at D1 (discussing Bankaholic.com, a website that lets consumers 
“shop” for credit cards and mortgages). 
 54. VYSE, supra note 52. 
 55. Id. at 75. 
 56. See Brooks, supra note 52. 
 57. Patrice Hill, Blame Abounds for Housing Bust, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2007, at A1; 
Editorial, The American Dream in Reverse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2007. 
 58. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S 
HOUSING 5 (2007), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2007/ 
son2007.pdf.  
 59. See Larry Rohter & Edmund L. Andrews, McCain Rejects Broad U.S. Aid on Mort-
gages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2008, at A1 (quoting Republican Presidential nominee John 
McCain “[s]ome Americans bought homes they couldn’t afford, betting that rising prices 
would make it easier to refinance later at more affordable rates”); see also Jessica Holzer, 
Major Bailout Is Unlikely on Sub-prime Mortgages, HILL, Sept. 4, 2007, 
http://thehill.com/business--lobby/major-bailout-is-unlikely-on-sub-prime-mortgages-2007-
09-04.html (reporting quote of President Bush, “[i]t’s not the government’s job to bail out 
speculators, or those who made the decision to buy a home they knew they could never af-
ford”); Irwin M. Stelzer, Why They Call It the Dismal Science, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 26, 
2007, at 1. 
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noted earlier, some borrowers inflated their incomes on liar loans or at-
tempted to use the credit of more creditworthy borrowers 60 
Even if it was utterly unrealistic for borrowers to think that their houses 
would never stop appreciating, homebuyers routinely discounted the risks 
associated with buying a home.61  For example, some borrowers were naïve 
(and perhaps greedy) in assuming that they could always expect their 
homes to increase in value.  Though this, obviously, is an unrealistic per-
spective, homebuyers’ behavior during the most recent housing boom was 
entirely consistent with buyer behavior during any boom market.  That is, 
once home prices start to rise, the market builds in the expectation that the 
increase is the norm and this expectation, in turn, increases borrower de-
mand for houses which, in turn, stimulates the demand for those homes and 
further causes the price of the houses to increase.62  As has been the case 
during other housing booms, some borrowers made irrational decisions in 
order to reap the potentially enormous profits in the housing price apprecia-
tion game.63  While borrowers may not have understood the true risks asso-
ciated with home ownership, the more sophisticated players (like econo-
mists, home builders, and lenders) were, of course, fully aware of the effect 
house appreciation has on borrower behavior. 64 
Whether greed, naiveté, or some other human factor caused borrowers to 
purchase homes they could not afford using mortgage products they often 
could not understand, once deregulation made it possible for consumers to 
borrow, borrow they did.  For the last decade, this country’s views about 
the norm of homeownership caused people to routinely buy homes using 
mortgage products they knew they would not be able to afford once the in-
terest rates increased.  Some borrowers knew they did not have the savings 
necessary to make mortgage payments once interest rates increased, but 
nonetheless signed the loan documents.  These borrowers gambled that the 
supra-normal trend in house price appreciation would continue and that in-
terest rates would remain low.  They gambled that they would be able to 
refinance the loans when the monthly payments increased, or that they 
 
 60. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
 61. Case & Shiller, supra note 21, at 35-37. 
 62. Id. at 9-13; KARL E. CASE ET AL., HOME-BUYERS, HOUSING AND THE MACROECON-
OMY (2003), available at http://urbanpolicy.berkeley.edu/pdf/CQSAustralia0804PB.pdf. 
 63. Robert J. Shiller, A Psychology Lesson from the Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 
2007, at C6.  See generally Case & Shiller, supra note 21, at 8-13 (discussing investment 
motives for homebuyers who intended to occupy their houses). 
 64. Mishkin, supra note 18. 
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would be able to sell their homes and make a profit.65  Sadly, the current 
foreclosure rates (which are the highest they have been in three decades) 
and the depth of the financial crisis are the result of this gamble.66 
II.  CONSUMER DEBT AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
A. Overall Debt Levels 
The United States has the highest consumer debt levels per capita of any 
nation, and consumer debt has grown exponentially since 1976.  Home and 
automobile loans, credit card debt, and consumer credit have all increased 
dramatically in the last few years.67  For example, in 1977, total U.S. 
household debt outstanding was $946.7 billion; over $600 billion of that 
was home mortgage debt.  By 2007, that $946.7 billion grew to $13.825 
trillion (an increase of over one trillion from 2006)68 and consumers had 
$957 billion in credit card and revolving debt just in March 2008.69  Simi-
larly, by 2007, home mortgage debt had increased from $600 billion to a 
staggering level of $10.508 trillion, and other consumer debt in 2007 was 
$2.550 trillion.70  Another indication of the shockingly high levels of con-
sumer debt can be found by comparing household debt to income and the 
U.S. gross domestic product (“GDP”).71  That is, in 2007, U.S. household 
 
 65. FISHBEIN & WOODALL, supra note 16, at 2, 11.  See generally Subprime and Preda-
tory Lending, supra note 24, at 7 (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit In-
surance Corporation); Christie, supra note 39. 
 66. Timothy R. Homan, U.S. Pending Home Resales Rise 7.4% as Prices Drop 
BLOOMBERG, Oct. 8, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid 
=aM0QF6wHRPoI. 
 67. As discussed in more detail below, lenders issued mortgage loans using relaxed cri-
teria that let borrowers purchase homes without documenting their income, without putting 
money down, and in some instances without paying the full cost of their monthly payments 
for the first few years of the loan term.  Similarly, automobile lenders started to extend 
credit to consumers with subprime credit and in some instances let consumers pay for the 
cars over longer periods.  David Cho & Nancy Trejos, From Foreclosure Signs to Auto 
Repo Lots, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2008, at A1; Robin Sidel, Smaller Banks Begin to Pay 
Price for their Boomtime Expansion, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2008, at A1. 
 68. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Statisti-
cal Release:  Consumer Credit—G.19 (Mar. 7, 2008) [hereinafter G19 Press Release], 
available at http://federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/20080307/g19.pdf. 
 69. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Statisti-
cal Release:  Consumer Credit—G.19 (July 8, 2008), available at http://federalreserve.gov/ 
releases/g19/20080708/g19.pdf. 
 70. G19 Press Release, supra note 68. 
 71. Gross domestic product is “the output of goods and services produced by labor or 
property located in the United States.”  News Release, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Gross 
Domestic Products:  Fourth Quarter 2008 (Advance) (Jan. 30, 2009), available at 
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2009/pdf/gdp408a.pdf. 
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debt grew at a faster pace than income (or overall economic activity), and 
the level of total household debt ($13.825 trillion) in 2007 was virtually 
identical to GDP ($13.843 trillion).72 
For the last several years, consumer spending in the United States has 
accounted for almost 70% of all U.S. economic activity.73  Similarly, hous-
ing expenditures have helped buoy U.S. economic growth for the last dec-
ade and, at times, contributed to 40% of total economic growth.74  The U.S. 
economy is now in a recession largely because of the role that consumer 
debt plays in this country and the vast amount of credit that has been ex-
tended to consumers over the last thirty years.75  The country’s current 
economic crisis was caused principally by staggering mortgage debt levels 
and borrowers’ inability to repay their mortgage loans.  While the problems 
started with subprime mortgages, the financial crisis spread to the entire 
housing sector and is now having devastating effects on the entire U.S. 
economy as well as global markets.76 
 
 72. G19 Press Release, supra note 68. 
 73. FANNIE MAE, THE GROWING DEMAND FOR HOUSING:  2002 FANNIE MAE NATIONAL 
HOUSING SURVEY (2002), http://www.fanniemae.com/global/pdf/media/survey/survey 
2002.pdf; Peter S. Goodman, Homeowners Feel the Pinch of Lost Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
8, 2007, at A1; Jack Healy, As the Recession Worsens, Consumers Save More and Spend 
Less, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, at B3.  Because higher home prices increase household 
wealth, housing price appreciation stimulates consumer spending.  See David Leonhardt, 
Debt and Spending May Slow as Housing Falters, Fed Suggests, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 
2007, at C3; Mishkin, supra note 18. 
 74. FANNIE MAE, supra note 73, at 2; Morgenson, supra note 30; see also Liz Wolge-
muth, The Credit Crunch Squeezes Municipal Bonds, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 28, 
2008, available at http://www.usnews.com/articles/business/economy/2008/02/28/the-credit 
-crunch-squeezes-municipal-bonds.html. 
 75. See Brooks, supra note 52. 
 76. The liquidity crisis that originally began in the subprime mortgage market has (as of 
October 2008) forced the U.S. government to take over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and 
place them in a conservatorship; David M. Herszenhorn, Administration Is Seeking $700 
Billion for Wall Street in Possible Record Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, at A1; to 
purchase an 80% interest in the country’s largest insurance conglomerate (American Inter-
national Group), Gretchen Morgenson, Your Money at Work, Fixing Others’ Mistakes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, at B1; to devote up to $700 billion in taxpayer dollars to purchase 
bad mortgage-backed securities from U.S. banks, Mark Landler & Edmund L. Andrews, 
Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow Tighter Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at 
A1; and has forced the liquidation of a number of mortgage lenders and hedge funds that 
invested in those lenders.  Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, A Lender Failed.  Did Its Auditor?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2008, at B1; Zachary A. Goldfarb & Alec Klein, The Bubble; How 
Homeowners’ Missed Mortgage Payments Set off Widespread Problems and Woke up the 
Fed., WASH. POST, June 16, 2008, at A1.  The U.S. financial crisis has also caused a run on 
or contributed to the insolvency of banks in Great Britain and France, caused the largest 
bank in France to freeze funds, and generally continues to wreak havoc on the global finan-
cial markets.  Vikas Bajaj & Mark Landler, Mortgage Losses Echo in Europe and on Wall 
Street, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2007, at A1; Mark Landler & Julia Werdigier, In Europe, 
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B. The Housing Crisis 
Homeowners are losing their homes in record numbers.  Mortgage loan 
defaults and foreclosure rates in the United States have hit record levels.  
Foreclosures in the United States increased by 81% over 2007 rates, in-
creased by 225% from 2006 rates, and, for much of 2008, almost one in ten 
mortgages were either past due or in foreclosure.77  The delinquency rates 
on non-traditional loans with adjustable interest rates have been especially 
high: the default rates increased by 141% in 2006 over 2005 rates.78  Fore-
closure filings on subprime mortgages have steadily increased for the last 
five years.79  Subprime loan foreclosures now account for over 60% of total 
foreclosure filings even though they accounted for less than 25% of loan 
originations, and until recently subprime mortgages were only 13% of all 
outstanding mortgages.80  Foreclosure rates on subprime ARMs are espe-
cially high81 and reports indicate that more than 40% of the most recent 
foreclosures were ARMs made to subprime borrowers.82  Industry experts 
project that the higher mortgage default and foreclosure rates will continue 
well into 2009.83 
 
Weathering Credit Storm from U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2007, at C1; Joe Nocera, 36 
Hours of Alarm and Action as Crisis Spiraled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at A1; Adam Shell, 
Subprime Troubles Send Stocks into Swoon, U.S.A. TODAY, Mar. 14, 2007, at 1B. 
 77. Vikas Bajaj & Michael M. Grynbaum, About 1 in 11 Mortgageholders Face Loan 
Problems, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2008, at C1; Realty Trac, Foreclosure Activity Increases 81 
Percent in 2008, http://www.realtytrac.com/foreclosure/foreclosure-rates.html (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2009). 
 78. Calculated Risk, supra note 34, at 11 (statement of Allen J. Fishbein, Director of 
Housing and Credit Policy, Consumer Federation of America), available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/ACF84D1.pdf. 
 79. Dan Levy, Foreclosures Doubled in September as Loan Rates Rise, BLOOMBERG, 
Oct. 11, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=apDsvvy6RO7 
M&refer=home; Credit & Collections World, Nationwide Foreclosures Jumped 75% in 
2007, Oct. 11, 2007, http://www.creditcollectionsworld.com/article.html?id=20080129S 
4FTCWQT. 
 80. Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 24, at 5 (statement of Michael D. Cal-
houn, President, Center for Responsible Lending). 
 81. Subprime loans have higher defaults than prime loans and ARMs have higher de-
fault rates and are at a significantly greater risk of foreclosure than fixed rate mortgages. 
Loans with high LTV rates have greater defaults than those with low LTV. See Press Re-
lease, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, National Civil Rights Groups Call for Immediate Mora-
torium on Foreclosures Resulting From Risky Subprime Loans (Apr. 4, 2007), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/press/releases/page.jsp?itemID=32110619. 
 82. Levy, supra note 79. 
 83. Straightening Out the Mortgage Mess:  How Can We Protect Home Ownership and 
Provide Relief to Consumers in Financial Distress?:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 
(2007) [hereinafter Straightening Out] (statement of Mark Zandi, Chief Economist, 
Moody’s Economy.com); CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, UPDATED PROJECTIONS OF SUB-
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1. Harm to Cash-Strapped Borrowers 
When borrowers started to default and the number of foreclosed houses 
started to rise, the value of their homes either became stagnant or dropped.  
Lenders would not extend these borrowers additional credit, even if they 
were high-income borrowers.  Because of this, homeowners could not tap 
into their home equity or refinance their homes to reduce their monthly 
payments to attempt to avoid a potential foreclosure.84 
Of course, some borrowers were destined to default since they could 
never afford the monthly loan payments.  But, some borrowers appear to 
have accepted exotic loans without understanding that other less expensive 
lending options might be available, and some mortgage brokers steered 
borrowers with good credit into higher-cost subprime mortgages.85  Bor-
rowers without college degrees, lower income borrowers, and black and 
Hispanic borrowers seemed especially likely to accept loan products they 
did not understand and could not afford.86  Unsophisticated borrowers also 
did not seem to be aware of the additional costs associated with homeown-
ership, like setting aside money for routine maintenance,87 or did not real-
ize that their loans did not escrow for taxes or property insurance.88 
 
PRIME FORECLOSURES IN THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR IMPACT ON HOME VALUES AND 
COMMUNITIES (2008), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/updated-foreclosure-and-
spillover-brief-8-18.pdf; Levy, supra note 79. 
 84. Calculated Risk, supra note 34, at 12-13 (statement of Allen J. Fishbein, Director of 
Housing and Credit Policy, Consumer Federation of America).  Some reports suggest that 
housing prices have not dropped this steeply since the Great Depression.  See Bob Ivry & 
Brian Louis, U.S. Home Construction Bust May Last Until 2011, BLOOMBERG, May 29, 
2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aKQoeHb1MraI; Levy, 
supra note 79.  Not even the wealthiest communities in the country have avoided the wave 
of foreclosures.  Christine Haughney, Pain of Foreclosures Spreads to the Affluent, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 25, 2008, at C1. 
 85. See Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 24 (statement of Shelia C. Bair, 
Chairman, Fed. Deposit Insurance Corporation); id. at 6 (statement of Allen Fishbein, Direc-
tor of Housing and Credit Policy, Consumer Federation of America); BUCKS & PENCE, su-
pra note 25. 
 86. BUCKS & PENCE, supra note 25, at 22; Patricia A. McCoy, Elder Law:  A Behavioral 
Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON. L. REV. 725, 735 (2005) (explaining how preda-
tory lenders prey on borrowers’ inexperience and lack of education). 
 87. John W. Schoen, Mortgage Woes Could Be ‘Tip of the Iceberg’, MSNBC, Apr. 10, 
2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17929461/. 
 88. See The Role of the Secondary Market, supra note 23, at 17 (statement of Larry B. 
Litton, Jr., President, CEO, Litton Loan Servicing LP) (recommending that subprime bor-
rowers establish an escrow account to pay taxes and insurance); Susan Schmidt Bies, Mem-
ber, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the National Credit Union Ad-
ministration 2007 Risk Mitigation Summit (Jan. 11, 2007), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bies20070111a.htm (suggesting the pru-
dence of escrowing tax and insurance payments or informing borrowers how much they 
should set aside for those payments). 
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2. Other Homeowners 
Since mid-2007, homeowners who did not have risky mortgages and 
who were not in default on those mortgages have bemoaned the fact that 
their homes have plummeted in value because of foreclosed and vacant 
homes in their neighborhoods.  Studies consistently show that an increase 
in foreclosures almost always will impose costs on neighboring properties 
by decreasing the value of homes that are near the foreclosed property.89  
Because appraisers determine the value of homes by considering compara-
ble sales, foreclosed properties can reduce the value of all homes in the 
neighboring area if they are used as comparables.  Thus, owners of 
neighboring properties who have acted responsibly and borrowed wisely 
may still be harmed when they try to sell their properties or refinance 
higher rate loans because of the stigma, economic effects, and the appear-
ance of foreclosed properties near their homes.90 
One of the main differences between this recession and the last recession 
is the inability of homeowners to borrow against their homes to help them 
pay their expenses during the recession.91  Once it became harder for po-
tential home buyers to refinance loans or to borrow money to buy new 
homes, the pool of available homebuyers shrank.  With fewer buyers, the 
demand dropped, which increased the supply of homes on the market, 
which then caused the price of all homes to drop.92  For example, single-
 
 89. Editorial, Losing Homes and Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2007, at A20; 
Les Christie, The Ugly Face of Foreclosure, CNNMONEY, May 7, 2007, http://money.cnn. 
com/2007/05/02/real_estate/face_of_foreclosure/index.htm. 
 90. Ian Urbina, Foreclosures Prompt Cities to Make Plea for Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 
2008, at A15; see also Calculated Risk, supra note 34, at 10 (statement of William A. Simp-
son, Vice President, Mortgage Insurance Companies of America); Stelzer, supra note 59 
(discussing externalities caused by mortgage crisis and the presence of homes with uncut 
grass); CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 83; Les Christie, Home Prices in Record 
9% Decline, CNNMONEY, Nov. 18, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/11/18/real_estate/ 
home_prices_third_quarter/index.htm. 
 91. After borrowers started to default on their homes loans and were unable to borrow 
money or obtain additional credit, they started to default on other loans.  For example, the 
automobile loan delinquency rate dramatically increased as a result of the mortgage melt-
down, especially for borrowers who had subprime credit.  David Cho & Nancy Trejos, 
From Foreclosure Signs to Auto Repo Lots, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2008, at A1; Jeffrey 
McCracken & Gregory Zuckerman, Surge in Auto-Loan Delinquencies Is Latest Trouble for 
the Economy, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 6, 2007, at A1. 
 92. Tara Siegel Bernard, Tighter Mortgage Standards Could Prolong Housing Slump, 
CNBC, May 15, 2007, http://www.cnbc.com/id/18663869/.  Lenders appear to have become 
especially wary of no doc and piggyback loans.  See Bob Tedeschi, Ripples From the Sub-
prime Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, at 11-13, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2007/03/25/realestate/25MORT.html?scp=1&sq=Ripples%20From%20the%20Subprime%
20Storm&st=cse. 
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family housing prices have dropped approximately 8% since 2007 and are 
at their lowest level since 1982.93 
3. Other Negative Externalities 
As noted earlier, this financial crisis has had a catastrophic effect on the 
entire financial community—especially the financial industry and other en-
tities involved with mortgage securitization.  Specifically, the liquidity re-
striction that led to the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, two 
of the largest investment banks in the world, caused the U.S. government to 
take over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and place them in a conservator-
ship, to purchase an 80% interest in American International Group (the 
country’s largest insurance conglomerate) to agree to insure the holdings of 
some money market mutual funds, to spend hundreds of billions of tax-
payer dollars to purchase debt from (and stocks of) U.S. banks, and has 
forced the liquidation of a number of mortgage lenders and hedge funds 
that invested in those lenders.94 
In addition to the investment banks that collapsed (Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs) two other giant firms ceased to function as investment 
banks and instead became bank holding companies.95  Smaller, regional 
banks that expanded their operations in distant markets or offered new, 
risky products also have suffered losses and have had lower than expected 
earnings because of the liquidity crisis and increased defaults on consumer 
loans.96  In addition, executives of large financial institutions, including 
Citigroup, Merrill Lynch (which recently was sold because of its financial 
problems), and Wachovia (the fourth largest bank in the United States 
which was sold to Wells Fargo at the end of 200897), have been fired be-
 
 93. Kenneth Musante, Foreclosure Filings Hit Record in April, CNNMONEY, May 14, 
2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/05/14/real_estate/foreclosure_rates/index.htm?post 
version=2008051408.  Japan experienced a similar housing crisis in the 1990s, when prices 
escalated drastically in the 1980s, then collapsed in the 1990s.  Alex Tabarrok, Home Sweet 
Investment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, at A23; Christie, supra note 90. 
 94. Edmund L. Andrews, Vast Bailout by U.S. Proposed in Bid to Stem Financial Crisis, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at A1; Julia Werdigier, Official Assurances Fail to Stem Rush 
of Withdrawals at British Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, at C3. 
 95. Ron Chernow, The Lost Tycoons, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, at WK12. 
 96. Geraldine Fabrikant, Tempest for a Bank That Bet on Risky Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
7, 2008, at C1; Robin Sidel, Smaller Banks Begin to Pay Price for Their Boomtime Expan-
sion, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2008, at A1; David Ellis, Wachovia CEO out at Board’s Re-
quest, CNNMONEY, June 2, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/06/02/news/companies/ 
wachovia_thompson/index.htm. 
 97. Michael J. de la Merced, Regulators Approve Wells Fargo Takeover of Wachovia, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at B1. 
DICKERSON_CHRISTENSEN 4/21/2009  3:51:06 PM 
416 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVI 
cause of decisions they made concerning mortgage products.98  Finally, our 
domestic credit crisis extended to Europe, forcing governments there to 
seize banks, bail out lenders, and guarantee all national bank deposits.99 
4. Other Non-Homeowner Borrowers 
The mortgage crisis has had unintended consequences for people who 
are not attempting to buy a house and who have not invested in or other-
wise been involved with the buying or selling of mortgage products.  Be-
cause of the credit restriction, college students are finding it harder to fi-
nance their educations because the economic crisis has made it harder for 
families to pay for college.100  Students who attend community colleges, 
for-profit technical schools, or colleges who have opted out of the federal 
student loan program are finding it especially difficult to pay for college.101  
Student loan lenders often raise money to make new loans by selling old 
loans to companies that then bundled them into securitized financial in-
struments. 
Similarly, because the mortgage crisis has now created an overall credit 
crunch, many student loan lenders withdrew or retreated from the student 
loan market when the number of investors willing to purchase the securi-
tized financial instruments declined or severely tightened their lending 
standards.102  Because of the student loan crisis, the U.S. government has 
also been forced to intervene in the student loan industry to ensure that col-
lege students will be able to finance their educations.103 
Finally, the credit squeeze has also made it difficult for colleges to raise 
money by issuing bonds or by increasing tuition, or by raising money from 
donors.  As a result of the credit freeze, declining state support, and losses 
on endowment earnings, colleges have been forced to halt construction pro-
 
 98. Stelzer, supra note 59 (discussing the dismissal of Merrill Lynch’s Stanley O’Neal 
and Citigroup’s Charles Prince); Jenny Anderson & Vikas Bajaj, Wary of Risk, Bankers 
Sold Shaky Mortgage Debt,  N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, at A1; Ellis, supra note 96. 
 99. Joe Nocera, A Day (Gasp) Like Any Other, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2008, at A1. 
 100. Jonathan D. Glater, Government Seeks to Buy Student Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 
2008, at A11. 
 101. An Alternative to Armageddon, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at C2; Jonathan D. 
Glater, Student Loans Start to Bypass 2-Year Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2008, at A1. 
 102. Robert Tomsho, Credit Crisis May Limit Options for Student Loans, WALL. ST. J., 
June 3, 2008, at D2.  Included in this group are large lenders, such as Bank of America and 
Citigroup.  Robert Tomsho, Students Face Hit as Private Lending Dries Up, WALL. ST. J., 
Aug. 11, 2008, at A1. 
 103. Karla Schuster, Schumer to Feds:  Help Students, NEWSDAY, Oct. 7, 2008, at A41. 
DICKERSON_CHRISTENSEN 4/21/2009  3:51:06 PM 
2009] THE MORTGAGE CRISIS AND U.S. CITIES 417 
jects, impose hiring freezes, and, in some instances, have made it difficult 
for colleges to pay their employees.104 
5. Urban Areas 
For a number of reasons, the housing crisis has severely harmed urban 
areas.  Rising mortgage foreclosures have had a devastating effect on U.S. 
cities because of the lower revenues they have received due to properties 
which are now less valuable.  Vallejo, a suburb of San Francisco, Califor-
nia, recently filed for bankruptcy protection because plunging home values 
coupled with a sharp decline in property taxes and retail sales rendered it 
unable to cover its expenses.105  Other cities have been forced to radically 
reduce municipal services (like operating swimming pools or providing 
free snow plowing services for older citizens) or to significantly increase 
the municipal taxes and fees to compensate for lower than projected reve-
nues.106 
The seizing up of the credit markets has made investors leery of invest-
ing in the stock market or any security other than U.S. Treasury securi-
ties.107  This has made it increasingly difficult for localities to finance their 
operations by issuing tax-exempt municipal bonds.108  Unlike the huge 
capital infusion into the private financial markets, the Internal Revenue 
Code generally prevents the federal government from guaranteeing tax-
exempt bonds.109 
 
 104. Kelly Field, Bank Freeze Leaves Hundreds of Colleges Cut off from Short-Term 
Funds, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 10, 2008, at A20; Karin Fischer, Public Universities 
Keep a Wary Eye on the Bond Market, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 9, 2008, at A1; Robin 
Wilson, As Credit Crisis Freezes Colleges, Worries Mount, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 10, 
2008, at A1. 
 105. Adam Tanner, San Francisco Suburb Vallejo Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS, May 
23, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/bondsNews/idUSN2352179020080523. 
 106. Nelson D. Schwartz, Can the Mortgage Crisis Swallow a Town?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
2, 2007, at C1. 
 107. David Goldman, Credit 2008:  Year of the Freeze, CNNMONEY, http://money.cnn. 
com/2008/12/31/markets/bondcenter/credit_market/index.htm.  The credit market endured a 
disastrous year in which the pipes of lending practically froze solid.  But trillions of dollars 
of bailouts is sending credit on the road to recovery.  Id. 
 108. See 26 U.S.C. § 149(b) (2006); NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, OPTIONS FOR CO-
ORDINATING TAX-EXEMPT FINANCING WITH STIMULUS AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY LEGISLA-
TION (2009), available at http://www.nabl.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=NABL_Com-
ment_Letters_Position_Statements1&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTI
D=9109. 
 109. See NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, supra note 108. 
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This financial crisis threatens to create the type of urban blight that cities 
have struggled to eradicate and avoid over the last twenty years.110  Cities, 
especially in urban areas, are now facing increased expenses because they 
are often forced to repair vacant homes to eliminate problems (like roofs 
and peeling paint) that are visible from the street.  Studies suggest that 
foreclosure rates increase a neighborhood’s rates for violent crime and, as a 
result of the mortgage crisis, cities have been forced to increase police pro-
tection in neighborhoods populated by vacant homes.111  The mortgage cri-
sis also is placing additional burdens on police departments because of the 
increase in suspected arsons committed by homeowners who cannot afford 
their mortgage payments and who are suspected of burning them rather 
than losing them in foreclosure.112 
Abandoned houses are natural targets for vandals and vagrants and, for 
the last two years, neighbors and others have reported that criminals have 
stripped foreclosed homes vacant of valuable items like copper and steel 
and have used the homes for illegal activities, such as harvesting mari-
juana.113  Cities are also seeing shifts in the homeless population as renters 
are joining the ranks of the homeless because they have been evicted from 
homes they rented after the owners defaulted on their mortgages and the 
homes were sold in foreclosure.114  Increased levels of homelessness have 
put strains on shelters and also on public school systems, which are now 
faced with the task of educating more transient children.115  Ironically, the 
mortgage crisis has had one small benefit for people who were already 
 
 110. Ian Urbina, Foreclosures Prompt Cities to Make Plea for Aid, N. Y. TIMES,  Jan. 24, 
2008, at A15 (discussing costs to board up properties, cut grass, demolish abandoned struc-
tures, collect trash, and protect from vandals).  The costs imposed on cities also may include 
the inability to borrow cheaply because of the decreased value of the collateral for those 
loans (i.e., the assessed value of their property base). Monica Davey, Housing Downturn 
Takes Big Toll on Cities’ Revenue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2007, at A20. 
 111. J.W. Elphinstone, Squalor, Crime Follow Wave of Foreclosures, MSNBC, Nov. 13, 
2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21773482. 
 112. Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclo-
sures on Neighborhood Crime, 21 HOUSING STUD. 851 (2006), available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/2005_conf_paper_session1_immergluck.pdf; Stel-
zer, supra note 59 (discussing how homes are stripped of sinks and aluminum siding during 
the eviction process); Jon Birger, Will Foreclosures Spark an Arson Boom?, CNNMONEY, 
Jan. 10, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/01/09/news/economy/birger_arson.fortune/index. 
htm. 
 113. Preserving the American Dream, supra note 29, at 22-23 (statement of Douglas G. 
Duncan, Senior Vice President of Research and Business Development, and Chief Econo-
mist, Mortgage Bankers Association), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_ 
files/duncan.pdf; Christie, supra note 89; Elphinstone, supra note 111. 
 114. Stephanie Armour, New Faces Join Ranks of Nation’s Homeless, U.S.A. TODAY, 
June 26, 2008, at 1B. 
 115. Schwartz, supra note 106. 
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homeless, as many homeless persons increasingly are squatting in vacant 
homes.  This, though, has placed yet more strains on police departments 
who are forced to increase their patrols of certain neighborhoods.116 
C. Responses to Current Debt Levels 
The initial response to the mortgage crisis was to ignore it and assume 
that the mortgage market would correct any inefficiencies.117  Indeed, the 
United States appeared to accept the mortgage industry’s contention that 
additional mortgage regulations are harmful and unnecessary, would make 
it harder for borrowers to get mortgage loans, would impede the basic 
American “privilege” of homeownership,118 and would conflict with exist-
ing federal laws and policies that encourage and subsidize homeowner-
ship.119  Moreover, borrowers theoretically could protect themselves from 
harmful credit products by shopping around in the marketplace, then choos-
ing the product that best suits their needs. 
For a short period of time, it did appear that the market had corrected 
problems because many lenders (including the second-largest subprime 
lender at that time, New Century Financial) stopped making bad loans as 
soon as borrowers started to default and others went out of business alto-
gether.120  But, market corrections simply were not enough to prevent the 
 
 116. Thomas J. Sheeran, Foreclosures Benefit One Group—Homeless, CHI. SUN TIMES, 
Feb. 18, 2008, at 22. 
 117. Martin Crutsinger, Paulson Says Administration Is Opposed to Government Bailout 
in Current Housing Crisis, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 17, 2007, at 1 (quoting Treasury Secre-
tary Henry Paulson, “I don’t think what we need is a big government bailout right now.  I 
think what we need is to help the markets work the way they’re intended to work and avoid 
those foreclosures that are preventable.”). 
 118. See Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 24, at 8 (statement of Harry H. 
Dinham, President, National Association of Mortgage Brokers) (“No merchant, no govern-
ment and no company should superimpose their own moral judgments on what is a basic 
American privilege of homeownership.”). 
 119. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS’N, SUITABILITY—DON’T TURN BACK THE CLOCK ON FAIR 
LENDING AND HOMEOWNERSHIP GAINS 20 (2007), available at http://www.mortgage 
bankers.org/files/News/InternalResource/48134_Suitability-DontTurnBacktheClockonFair 
LendingandHomeownershipGains.pdf; see Calculated Risk, supra note 34, at 13 (statement 
of George Hanzimanolis, President-Elect, National Association of Mortgage Brokers), 
available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/hanzimanolis.pdf (“Unwarranted tight-
ening of underwriting guidelines could hurt the robust housing industry and deny deserving 
consumers the chance at homeownership.”).  While most entities involved with the mort-
gage industry oppose moratoriums of any kind, at least one loan servicing agency agreed 
that a two-week “delay” would be appropriate.  See The Role of the Secondary Market, su-
pra note 23, at 17 (statement of Larry B. Litton, Jr., President, CEO, Litton Loan Servicing 
LP). 
 120. New Century Financial stopped making subprime loans, filed for bankruptcy on 
April 2, 2007, and is now in the process of selling off assets.  See Ben Fidler, New Century 
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subprime crisis from rippling through all financial sectors, or from sending 
the U.S. economy into a recession and wreaking havoc in the global capital 
markets.  Starting with the Bear Stearns bailout, U.S. policy-makers were 
forced to concede that a market response alone was woefully inadequate. 
Market responses have failed, and will not prevent borrowers from mak-
ing poor or totally irrational credit choices in the future in large part be-
cause of the information asymmetry that plagues the consumer credit mar-
ket.121  The plethora and complexity of terms that govern credit card 
transactions and non-traditional mortgage products make it almost inevita-
ble that borrowers will be confused by the products, will be unable to com-
prehend the loan terms, and that it will be virtually impossible for borrow-
ers to easily determine which loan product best meets their needs.122  While 
credit card use is common, individual borrowers typically take out mort-
gages on an infrequent basis which means that borrowers will always be at 
an informational disadvantage relative to lenders.  Because of the complex-
ity of credit card and mortgage products, “information overload” appears to 
cause many borrowers to agree to terms and to accept products that have 
terms they do not understand.123 
Both state and federal regulators and legislators have attempted to find 
ways to solve the over-indebtedness problem generally and the mortgage 
crisis specifically.  For example, federal regulators have considered stan-
dards used in some state consumer protection laws that require lenders to 
consider whether mortgage loans, especially subprime loans, are suitable 
for the borrower’s objectives and circumstances, and that such loans would 
provide a demonstrable benefit to homeowners.124  In addition, some states 
 
Assets Sale Continues, DEAL, Feb. 14, 2008; Morgenson, supra note 22; see also Eric Dash, 
American Home Mortgage Says It Will Close, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007, at C1 (discussing 
companies in the mortgage industry that were closing or facing bankruptcy). 
 121. See Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 24, at 5 (statement of Shelia C. 
Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); id. at 6 (statement of Allen 
Fishbein, Director of Housing and Credit Policy, Consumer Federation of America); BUCKS 
& PENCE, supra note 25, at 3; WIRANOWSKI, supra note 25, at 6 (discussing informational 
rents extracted from naïve consumers by sophisticated lenders). 
 122. See Stephen Gandel et al., For Sale:  Scenes from a Bubble, MONEY, May 2007, at 
114; see also Preserving the American Dream, supra note 29, at 5 (statement of Hilary 
Shelton, Director, NAACP Washington Bureau), available at http://banking.senate.gov/ 
public/_files/shelton.pdf. 
 123. REN S. ESSENE & WILLIAM APGAR, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD 
UNIV., UNDERSTANDING MORTGAGE MARKET BEHAVIOR:  CREATING GOOD MORTGAGE OP-
TIONS FOR ALL AMERICANS 11 (2007). 
 124. See Possible Responses to Rising Mortgage Foreclosures:  Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Possible Responses] 
(statement of John H. Dalton, President, Housing Policy Council of the Financial Services 
Roundtable), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/hearing110/htdalton041707.pdf. 
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have enacted laws that require lenders to consider the borrower’s ability to 
repay the loan, rather than the foreclosure value of the house, when approv-
ing a mortgage loan.125 
Congress also has considered legislation that would revise the U.S. 
bankruptcy laws to protect borrowers who owe more to the lender than the 
home is worth because, for example, the borrowers paid interest only early 
in the loan term, made no down payment and had not yet built up equity in 
the home, or removed their equity with a home equity loan.  The proposed 
legislation would let borrowers reduce the amount of the lender’s interest in 
the debtor’s principal residence to the market value of the home, and also 
would let the consumer modify the terms of the loan, including extending 
maturity dates and reamortizing the loan to potentially create a “balloon” 
payment in anticipation of a loan refinance when interest rates (hopefully) 
drop.126 
The mortgage industry continues to fight bankruptcy reforms, even as 
they aggressively lobby for bailouts for their industry.  Lenders argue that 
making it easier for borrowers to reduce the amount of their mortgage debt 
will harm young, first-time homeowners as well as black and Hispanic bor-
rowers by making loans that are already in default sink deeper into default, 
and by forcing lenders to increase the costs of future loans to account for 
the possibility that it may be harder for them to seize the collateral (the 
home) through foreclosure.127  Lenders argue that the restrictions are not 
needed because consumers can protect themselves by becoming more fi-
nancially sophisticated and obtaining the information needed to make 
sound borrowing decisions.128  Finally, lenders argue that preventing them 
 
 125. The Mortgage Lending Market:  An Insiders’ Guide to Legislation and Litigation, 
124 BANKING L.J. 867, 880-81 (2007); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-40-105 (2007) (an 
unconscionable practice is “providing residential mortgage loans to consumers . . . without 
regard to the consumer’s ability to repay a loan in accordance with its terms”); MINN. STAT. 
§ 58.13 (2007) (no residential mortgage originator may “make, provide, or arrange for a 
residential mortgage loan without verifying the borrower’s reasonable ability to pay the 
scheduled payments”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.031 (West 2007) (an unconscionable 
practice is “providing consumer transactions . . . without regard to the consumer’s ability to 
repay the loan in accordance with its terms”). 
 126. S. 2136, 110th Cong. § 102 (2008); S. 2133, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007); H.R. 3778, 
110th Cong. § 2 (2007); H.R. 3609, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 127. See Straightening Out, supra note 83 (statement of Steve Bartlett, President, CEO, 
Financial Services Roundtable).  But cf. id. (statement of Mark Zandi, Ph.D., Chief Econo-
mist, Moody’s Economy.com) (arguing that the legislation is needed and will not signifi-
cantly increase the cost of mortgage credit). 
 128. Subprime and Predatory Lending, supra note 24, at 8 (statement of Harry H. Din-
ham, President, National Association of Mortgage Brokers); Preserving the American 
Dream, supra note 29, at 29-30 (statement of Douglas G. Duncan, Senior Vice President, 
Research and Business Development, and Chief Economist, Mortgage Bankers Associa-
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from foreclosing on properties will also create negative externalities, such 
as lowering the value of neighboring homes and giving criminals an incen-
tive to vandalize vacant homes.129 
While Congress has not been willing to revise bankruptcy laws to allow 
debtors to reduce the amount of the debt they owe on homes that are now 
worth less than their mortgages, Congress did create a program that al-
lowed some borrowers to replace their non-traditional ARM loans with tra-
ditional thirty-year fixed-rate loans that have low LTV ratios.  While the 
program is voluntary, lenders who are willing to renegotiate the loan can 
require borrowers to document their income, borrowers cannot take out a 
home equity loan for five years after receiving this new mortgage, and bor-
rowers must give the United States at least 50% of any appreciation on the 
home when he sells it.  Moreover, to prevent pure real estate flipping, if the 
sale takes place in less than five years, the borrower might be required to 
return all the gain to the government.130 
In addition to rejecting the approach of not intervening at all in the mar-
ket, or of embracing the government’s limited relief for borrowers (rather 
than for lenders or those who invested in mortgage-backed securities), oth-
ers have suggested or taken somewhat more radical approaches.  Harvard 
Law Professor Elizabeth Warren has recently argued that the United States 
needs to have a “Financial Product Safety Commission” that reviews credit 
cards, mortgage loans, and health and life insurance policies to make sure 
the products have terms that consumers have a realistic chance of under-
standing.  Professor Warren argues that this commission should be charged 
with preparing and promoting uniform disclosures that make it easier for 
consumers to compare different lenders’’ products.  She also contends that 
a commission of this type could be used to make sure that credit products 
do not have terms that are impossible for the average consumer to assess.131 
 
tion), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/duncan.pdf; Possible Responses, 
supra note 124, at 11 (statement of George P. Miller, Executive Director, American Securi-
tization Forum, also on behalf of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association), 
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/hearing110/htmiller041707.pdf. 
 129. Preserving the American Dream, supra note 29, at 22-23 (statement of Douglas G. 
Duncan, Senior Vice President, Research and Business Development, and Chief Economist, 
Mortgage Bankers Association); see also Christie, supra note 89. 
 130. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, H.R. 3221, 110th Cong. (2008); 
Kenneth R. Harney, A Look at Congress’s Long-Promised, Long-Delayed Mortgage Relief, 
WASH. POST, Jul. 19, 2008, at F1; News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 
Bush Administration Launches “Hope for Homeowners” Program to Help More Struggling 
Families Keep Their Homes (Oct. 1, 2008), available at http://www.hud.gov/news/release. 
cfm?content=pr08-150.cfm. 
 131. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 
(2008). 
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The sheriff of the City of Philadelphia, with the implicit support of local 
judges and political leaders, crafted a novel (though likely illegal) response 
to the foreclosure crisis.  As is true in many jurisdictions, the sheriff’s of-
fice in the City of Philadelphia has the legal duty to conduct foreclosure 
sales.  After Philadelphia citizens defaulted on their mortgages in record 
numbers, the sheriff declared that his office would no longer conduct court-
ordered foreclosure auctions.132  Once mortgage lenders, servicers, and 
their attorneys realized that the sheriff’s decision was becoming a public 
relations problem for them—not the sheriff—they entered into an agree-
ment with housing advocates and local judges to work out a process that 
would make loans more affordable for delinquent borrowers.133  This re-
sponse worked principally because the local judges were not willing to en-
ter an order forcing the sheriff to conduct the foreclosures, and also because 
housing advocates had successfully lobbied members of the city council, 
who also supported the sheriff’s decision to halt foreclosure sales.134 
III.  POTENTIAL RESPONSES BY URBAN COMMUNITIES 
While it may be unrealistic to expect cities to be the primary opponents 
to the consumer credit industry, cities can no longer afford to take a hands-
off approach to consumer credit or to expect the U.S. government to pro-
vide a billion-dollar bailout for cities or for the homeowners who live in 
those cities.  Therefore, urban areas will need to take a more proactive ap-
proach to protect themselves and their citizens during this financial crisis. 
For a number of reasons, urban areas should be concerned with con-
sumer over-indebtedness in general, as well as with the current mortgage 
meltdown.  Localities desire economically stable citizens and neighbor-
hoods because they “market” their cities and citizens when attempting to 
attract both new citizens and businesses.  Having overwhelmed, over-
indebted citizens is not a particularly attractive selling point for cities that 
wish to attract new businesses.  Localities also have an interest in having 
citizens who are not over-indebted because of the value this country gener-
ally places on individual entrepreneurship.  To the extent the locality (or, 
indeed, the nation) wants to encourage innovation, there must be some way 
to help relieve the financial burdens that over-indebtedness poses on indi-
viduals, because individuals who are permanently in debt will never be able 
to fully participate in a market society and will never be able to start a new 
 
 132. Michael M. Phillips, To Help Broke Homeowners, He’s Taking the Law into His 
Own Hands, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2008, at A1. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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business.  Similarly, because this country and, as a result, localities depend 
on consumer spending, localities, have an incentive to prevent over-
indebted consumers from drowning in credit; otherwise those consumers 
will never be able to meaningfully contribute to the market economy. 
Increased foreclosures also create the unexpected problem of the dis-
placed voter.  This unexpected challenge is particularly problematic for lo-
calities during a presidential election year.  Because of the number of peo-
ple who have been evicted from their homes this year, cities were forced to 
address election issues like determining which residents were allowed to 
vote in particular elections and where the residents should vote if they were 
forced to move because of a foreclosure but failed to notify their local elec-
tion boards.135  Fortunately, though, there is no indication that this affected 
the 2008 national elections.136 
To directly combat the problem of abandoned homes, urban areas will 
need to consider how (or whether) to expand their role as landlords or land 
developers.  Because of the number of foreclosed properties in some urban 
areas, cities have started to purchase, repair, and then resell foreclosed 
properties rather than allow dilapidated properties to cause additional harm 
to distressed neighborhoods.137  The subprime meltdown has forced other 
cities to take even more drastic measures, including demolishing some va-
cant homes and turning the real property into parks or additional yards for 
neighbors who remain in the neighborhood.138 
Because of decreased property tax revenues, some localities cannot af-
ford to purchase these properties and have sought financial assistance from 
state legislatures, Congress, and in some instances, from the courts.139  
While the Bush Administration originally opposed federal grants to help 
localities purchase foreclosed properties, because of the recent massive 
mortgage bailout,140 the Obama Administration has expressed its willing-
ness to support governmental intervention in jump-starting local housing 
 
 135. See Ian Urbina, As Homes Are Lost, Fears that Votes Will Be, Too, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 25, 2008, at A18 (describing methods localities and states are using to verify voters’ 
addresses). 
 136. ASS’N OF CMTY. ORGS. FOR REFORM NOW, ADDING INSULT TO INJURY (2008), avail-
able at www.acorn.org/fileadmin/Reports/Insult_to_Injury_Report.pdf (discussing how 
residency issues could potentially affect the then-upcoming 2008 presidential election). 
 137. See Vikas Bajaj, Communities Become Home Buyers to Fight Decay, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 26, 2008, at C1; Manny Fernandez, To Avert Blight, City Will Repair and Resell Va-
cant Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009, at A27. 
 138. See Bajaj, supra note 137. 
 139. See Conor Dougherty & Amy Merrick, States Squeeze Cities, Spreading the Eco-
nomic Pain, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2008, at A4. 
 140. See Rosalind S. Helderman & Ovetta Wiggins, Localities Firming up Foreclosure 
Aid Plans; Proposals Due Soon on Use of $22 Million, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2008, at B1. 
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markets.141  Municipalities may also need to encourage Congress to con-
sider revising the Internal Revenue Code or find other ways to allow the 
federal government to guarantee municipal bonds without placing the mu-
nicipalities’ tax-exempt status at risk. 
Finally, since deregulating the consumer credit market caused the con-
sumer credit explosion, another way to protect urban areas and innocent 
homeowners is to intercede and re-regulate—at least partially—the mort-
gage market.142  Localities may need to lobby state legislators to make it 
harder for payday lenders or title pawn companies to operate in their cities.  
Further, while states currently allow their citizens to take out home equity 
loans, localities should consider whether it is time to lobby their state legis-
lators to enact laws that make it harder for cash-strapped borrowers to treat 
their homes like an ATM card. 
CONCLUSION 
Record numbers of mortgage defaults have triggered a financial crisis 
that has threatened the U.S. and global capital markets and will continue to 
have a dramatic effect on U.S. cities.  Given the magnitude of the mortgage 
mess, most of the focus is on stemming the number of foreclosures and 
preventing greater harm to the economy. 
The bigger problem, of course, is the larger issue of consumer over-
indebtedness itself.  While this country (and urban areas) certainly should 
be concerned that people are losing their homes, to ensure that our current 
problems do not repeat themselves in the future it is time for everyone to 
focus not just on the mortgage debt that has caused borrowers to lose their 
homes, but also to focus on ways to reduce the numbers of borrowers who 
are just too deeply in debt. 
 
 141. Tami Luhby, Saving a City—One House at a Time, CNNMONEY, Jan. 29, 2009, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/29/news/economy/neighborhood_stabilization/. 
 142. On Strengthening our Economy:  Foreclosure Prevention and Neighborhood Pres-
ervation:  Hearing Before S. Banking Comm., 110th Cong. 4-5 (2008) (statement of Doris 
W. Koo, President, CEO, Enterprise Community Partners, Inc.). 
